Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose some of their benefits if their earnings exceed certain thresholds ("cash-cliffs"). When this reduction is too high, this implicit taxation of earnings is considered to be one of the prime reasons for the low outflow from DI. This paper analyzes a conditional cash program that incentivizes work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. A randomized group of DI beneficiaries receive the offer to claim a payment of up to CHF 72,000 (USD 71,000) if they take up or expand employment and reduce DI claims. This paper presents the results of the short-term evaluation by analyzing the first reactions to the announcement of seed capital. Overall, the interest in taking-up the financial incentive is low at only 3%. Individuals close to cash-cliffs react more on seed capital but the overall magnitude is small. Our results suggest that workdisincentives imposed by cash-cliffs are unlikely to be the main driver for low employment and outflow from the Swiss disability insurance system, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set and bunching behavior at cashcliffs prior to the implementation of seed capital.
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Introduction
The high number of disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries -about 6% of the OECD working-age population received disability benefits in 2007 -generates high costs to society.
In 2007, OECD countries spent on average 1.2% of their GDP on DI benefits, almost 2.5 times as much as what was spent on unemployment benefits. Outflow from DI programs other than into old-age pension is relatively low at 1-2% per year (OECD 2003 (OECD , 2009 (OECD , 2010 .
DI programs are typically characterized by apparent work disincentives. Individuals loose (part of) their benefit if earnings exceed certain thresholds (so called "cash-cliffs"). These work incentives are often claimed to be the prime reason for the low outflow from the disability insurance. The OECD (2010) calls for reforms that seek to increase outflow from the disability insurance by providing return-to-work incentives. Creditable empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these reforms is, however, scarce.
1 Notable exceptions are Campolieti & Riddell (2012) who evaluate a change in the earning disregard, i.e. the amount of earnings DI beneficiaries are allowed to earn without losing their benefits, Kostøl & Mogstad (2013) as well as Weathers & Hemmeter (2011) who evaluate the introduction of a gradual reduction in benefits when people take-up or expand work, and Gettens (2009) who analyzes the effect of expanding health insurance coverage to individuals leaving Social Security Disability
Insurance into employment. Some of these policies increased employment (not the Medicaid 1 There are, however, other types of DI reforms: Policies to reduce DI inflow, such as reducing the benefit generosity, altering the eligibility criteria, or implementing stricter screening, were relatively successful in reducing the number of DI beneficiaries (see for example in de Jong, Lindeboom and van der Klaauw 2011, Staubli 2011 , Low and Pistaferri 2010 , van Vuren and van Vuuren 2007 . Policies aimed at increasing DI outflow by providing access to vocational rehabilitation and employment integration measures were less effective. Results indicate low take-ups and no or only small effects on outflow (Adam, Bozio und Emmerson 2010 , Stapleton, et al. 2008 , Thornton, et al. 2004 , Kornfeld and Rupp 2000 . 2 expansion) but had no effect on DI outflow. Less is known about conditional cash incentives that are paid out if people reduce their benefits or even leave the disability insurance.
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of a conditional cash program ("seed capital") targeted at stimulating employment and outflow from disability insurance in Switzerland.
Seed capital differs in three distinct ways from programs discussed in the literature: First, it is a conditional cash program that is specifically designed to incentivize return-to-work and outflow in a partial DI system. Seed capital can only be claimed if the individual takes up or expands employment, and, as a consequence, has the disability pension reduced by at least one quarter. 2 Second, the financial incentive is rather large in absolute terms. For a reduction of disability benefits by one quarter, the payment is either CHF 9,000 or CHF 18,000. The maximum payment for somebody who foregoes a full pension is thus CHF 72,000 (about USD 71,000 at the time of the introduction of the program in September 2010), which corresponds roughly to the average disposable yearly income of Swiss households (FSO 2007) . Finally, the payment is lump-sum, does not depend on the benefit level and enjoys preferential tax treatment.
Seed capital was implemented as a social field experiment where a randomized group of individuals could claim the payment. This paper presents the results of a short-term evaluation, where first reactions to the announcement of seed capital are used as the prime outcome variable. Overall, the interest in taking up seed capital is rather low. Only 3% of the treated individuals contacted their local insurance office to ask for more information; offering a higher payment did not result in higher take-up. Micro-simulations demonstrate that for a majority of individuals, returning to the labor market for a period of more than two years 2 Our paper is thus in contrast to the literature that looks at the pure income effects imposed by the DI system (Autor and Duggan 2007, Marie and Vall Castello 2012) .
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would not have been beneficial even after accounting for the sizeable seed capital offset. Only individuals who desire to work more but are discouraged to expand work because working more does not pay off (cash-cliff constrained) should be attracted. We observe people with disability degrees at cash cliffs to react stronger on seed capital, but the magnitude of this effect is rather small. Our results thus suggests that cash-cliffs imposed by the stepwise partial DI benefit system have no or only little impact on employment, and consequently that financial incentives to overcome cash-cliffs are ineffective -at least in the Swiss DI system.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the disability insurance system in the Switzerland, discusses the design of the experiment, and outlines its expected impact in a standard labor supply model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results of the short-term evaluation, and Section 5 concludes.
Swiss disability insurance system and the experiment
An overview of the institutional setting 2.1
In Switzerland, individuals who partially or fully lose the ability to work due to impaired health can claim disability benefits. Payments in case of disability come from three different social security programs:
3 from mandatory public disability insurance that covers all persons living or working in Switzerland (first pillar), from the occupational pension scheme -an employer-based funding scheme that is mandatory for all employees whose annual earnings exceed CHF 20,000 (second pillar), and from the supplementary benefit scheme -meanstested benefits that are granted on demand in case disability benefits and other incomes are 3 If the disability is caused by an accident or an occupational disease, then it is likely that pensions are paid from the public accident insurance scheme. This insurance type, however, is not the focus of this paper and is thus not further considered.
4 not sufficient to meet minimal costs of living (comparable to the Supplemental Security Income in the US). The generosity of the different DI programs depends on various other factors, such as contribution years, average lifetime earnings and the number of dependent children. The first two pillars aim at guaranteeing a replacement rate of up to 60-80% (net of tax). Means-tested benefits secure an income of CHF 3,000 for singles and CHF 4,500 for couples plus additional health care costs.
The Swiss DI systems allows for partial disability, which implies that insured persons can receive DI benefits even if they still have some work capacity. They are thus allowed to stay at work or return to work on a part-time basis. The partial pension depends on the disability degree -the predicted loss in earnings due to the disability. 4 DI beneficiaries receive a quarter pension with a disability degree between 40% and 49%, a semi pension with a disability degree between 50% and 59%, a three-quarter pension with a disability degree between 60%
and 69%, and a full pension with a disability degree of 70% and higher.
The assessment on the disability degree is made by the local DI insurance office (first pillar). To calculate the disability degree, DI case workers must quantify two counterfactual earnings -the potential earnings with and without disability for each individual. Case workers typically predict the potential earnings without a disability based on the earnings before the onset of the disability. Depending to which 'treatment' group a DI pensioner is randomly assigned to, seed capital is either CHF 9,000 or CHF 18,000 per reduced quarter pension. The maximum seed capital for a person with a full pension who exits the disability insurance is thus CHF 36,000
or CHF 72,000, respectively. The former sum corresponds to a minimum yearly income in disability (implicitly guaranteed by means-tested benefits), the latter approximately to the average income of a Swiss household.
The pilot project was implemented in two different Swiss cantons (St. Gallen, a German speaking canton and Vaud, a French speaking canton). From a total of 37,853 DI beneficiaries in these two cantons, 6,020 individuals were chosen for participation based on stratified randomization (details are to be found in Table 1 in Appendix C) and subsequently randomized into one control group not eligible to for seed capital (N=2,020) and two treatment groups that can claim a seed capital of CHF 9,000/18,000 per reduced quarter pension (N=2,000 each). The trial phase for this payment has been restricted from September 2010 to August 2013.
The pilot project was announced to members of the two treatment groups by a written notification from their local DI office in September 2010. This letter explained the conditions for the seed capital as well as the fallback rule and invited participants to contact their local disability office to ask for further information and assistance. The control group was not contacted.
For the following six months, the local DI offices recorded all contacts with the participants of the treatment groups to document potential interest in the program. Since 7 documented interest has fallen far behind the official expectations (see also Section 4), the FSIO refrained from a medium and long-term evaluation. This paper therefore provides a short-term evaluation only by focusing on these immediate reactions (which can however be expected to be good predictors of the long-term reactions).
A stylized model for the effect of seed capital 2.3
We illustrate the basic economic forces at work using a simple static model in which individuals maximize utility over consumption ( ) and leisure ( ). Leisure should be thought of as a short cut for the disutility of labor or the work impairment an individual encounters.
To make the model tractable we use a number of simplifying assumptions: A single level of pension benefits and thus a single notch point is assumed (ignoring the further steps in the Swiss scheme). Individuals receive disability insurance benefits ( ) if hours of work ( , where denotes the maximum time available for either leisure activities or work) fall below a certain threshold ( ). Individuals are able to work and mimic work incapacity by choosing the number of working hours. Seed capital ( ) is paid out if DI pensioners expand work above the threshold level and thus loose DI benefits.
Our model is static and compares a situation without seed capital ( 0) to a situation with seed capital ( 0). In the absence of seed capital, we expect three types of DI pensioners: Chosen employment is at the boundary optimum, where people either choose not to work at all (type 1) or to work exactly at the "cash cliff" that determines the next lower benefit level (type 2). While the individual choosing the former may have very high disutility of work or low wages (both may reflect the consequences of a disability), individuals choosing the latter would work more if they did not lose disability benefits. The remaining 8 individuals chose employment at the interior solution with the optimal level of hours of work being to the left of the cash-cliff (type 3).
In the seed capital scenario, DI pensioners receive a lump-sum payment if they increase hours of work and lose DI benefits. Two different situations can now occur ( Figure 1 ): (1) Seed capital does not fully (or just) compensate for the benefit loss (first panel), or (2) seed capital overcompensates for the benefit loss (second panel). In the first case, only individuals who would have chosen their hours of work exactly at the notch point in the absence of seed capital (type 2) change their behavior. This is subject to the condition that the additional earnings and seed capital payment compensates for the loss in benefits and for the higher disutility caused by employment. In other words, total income (earnings, seed capital and DI benefits) after expanding employment must be strictly higher than total income in the status quo. For all others, the optimal decision remains unchanged (compared to a situation without seed capital). If the seed capital overcompensates for the benefit loss, also individuals who choose hours of work below the benefit notch in a world without seed capital react to seed capital. These individuals, however, increase working hours only to the next notch point so that they "just" meet the condition for receiving the seed capital but do not increase work beyond that point.
The simple model also demonstrates the limits of financial incentives: Seed capital increases employment and reduced DI benefits for people of type 1 and type 3 if they are overcompensated for the benefit loss. This implies that the amount of averted DI benefits is less than seed capital payments, which cannot be a cost-effective intervention from the perspective of the insurance system. This finding is particularly relevant in the Swiss setting where individuals receive DI benefits from several sources, while seed capital is paid from the first pillar only. Overcompensation would mean that the public pension system (first pillar) "subsidizes" the private occupational pension system (second pillar). Seed capital should thus provide an incentive to expand employment for individuals who are cash-cliff constrained, but should not overcompensate for forgone benefits.
Data
To evaluate the pilot project, we use data from three different sources. Our prime outcome variable is individuals' short-term interest in the program.
6 This information is 6 Since the pilot phase ended in 2013, ideally we would have liked to have information on take-up and labor market outcomes following take-up. Unfortunately, the FSIO terminated the evaluation of the pilot study before the end of the pilot phase and we do not have the information, who took-up seed capital.
provided by the local DI offices, which recorded all contacts with DI recipients that were randomized in any of the treatment groups. This information is not provided for individuals of the control group (they were not informed about the program). We therefore restrict our analysis to the two treatment groups which differ with respect to the randomly chosen size of the seed capital (CHF 9,000 vs. 18,000 CHF).
Moreover, we have both administrative records and survey data from time periods prior the implementation of the experiment. The administrative records from the first pillar of the Swiss pension system report the full labor market history and the size of first pillar DI pensions (but not occupational DI pensions or supplementary means-tested benefits). A telephone survey took place prior to the experiment to learn more about the motivation of potential recipients to apply for seed capital. Of the randomly selected 8,000 individuals, 51%
responded. The survey had been designed to capture current employment, work incentives and preferences, income sources other than first pillar DI pensions (i.e. labor market earnings, second pillar DI pensions, and supplementary benefits), health status, and individual background variables such as marital status, number of children, and education. The data are used to select the study participants (section 2.2), to simulate the return-to-work incentives (section 4.1), and to study heterogeneities with respect to relevant background variables (section 4.2). Descriptive statistics for all variables used in our analysis are provided in Table   2 in Appendix C.
Short-term results of the pilot project
Simulating the financial implication of seed capital 4.1 Setting the optimal value of seed capital is a difficult task. Ideally, the insurance sets seed capital individually for each recipient to incentivize employment among those who are cash-11 cliff constrained but not to overcompensate for forgone DI benefits. In practice this is difficult since the public disability insurance (first pillar) has no information on second pillar benefits and cannot predict the total size of the cash-cliff (i.e., the present value of forgone DI benefit from all sources). They are thus forced to specify a lump-sum amount. In a first step, we investigate if the proposed amounts of CHF 9,000 and 18,000 are adequate to incentivize employment.
Our simulation depends on the length of the return-to-work period: In 2010, individuals had the legal possibility to return to old DI contracts when they are unable to work for a continuum of 30 days within the first five years after reintegration. We therefore simulate a return-to-work period of two years where people have their old DI contracts reinstated after they received the last payment tranche. One has to keep in mind, however, that there was a lively political debate on future reforms of the Swiss Disability Insurance Act -particularly on how to better exhaust the reintegration potential among current DI pensioners. DI recipients may thus have feared that any action to take-up seed capital could signal that the initial preconditions for DI benefits no longer exists, and that they cannot fallback into their old DI contract anymore. We therefore consider two alternative scenarios, where individuals increase employment for a period of five years and then fall back into the disability insurance with their old disability degree (but not into their old DI contract), or where they increase employment until retirement and do not fall back into the disability insurance at all.
We assume that individuals increase employment exactly to the next cash-cliff threshold.
In our data we observe actual earnings (if working) and the disability degree, but not the potential earnings needed to determine the individual cash-cliff thresholds. To construct the cash-cliff thresholds, we assume that the current employment level corresponds to the disability degree. In other words, if a person had an initial disability degree of 50%, the 12 employment level increases to 60% and the disability degree declines to 40% when taking-up seed capital. This means that current labor market earnings increase by 20%. For individuals who are currently not working, we predict earnings when taking-up employment based on information of individuals who are working and comparable in their background variables (see Appendix B for more details).
During the return-to-work period, increased earnings lead to a reduction in first and second pillar benefits by one quarter. We recalculate means-tested benefits, which is a function of earnings and first and second pillar benefits. We assume that those who return-towork for two years fall back into their old DI contract. Compared to the status-quo, DI benefits decline during the return-to-work period but payments follow the same path than in the status quo afterwards. This is not the case when the return-to-work period is five years and longer. Here, DI benefits need to be recalculated even if people fall back into their old disability degree. Furthermore, return-to-work has implications for old-age pensions, which also need to be recalculated. We provide a detailed description of the simulation in Appendix A.
Based on the micro-simulation, we estimate the necessary return-to work condition for different types of individuals. Types are not directly observed in our data. We assess types based on information collected shorty before they received the offer for seed capital: Type 1 are individuals who do not work at all, irrespective of the disability degree (in total 65% of our sample), cash-cliff constrained individuals (type 2) are those who work and have a disability degree exactly at the threshold (12% of our sample), and type 3 are individuals who work and have a disability degree not at the threshold (23% of our sample).
The result of the simulation is presented in Table 1 . If people perceive that they can reinstate their old DI contract after two years, 14% of the total population may react on the 13 low seed capital of CHF 9,000, and almost half of the population may be attracted by high seed capital. With the low seed capital, particularly those who are cash-cliff constrained would react on seed capital. With longer return-to-work periods, the share of individuals overcompensated for the benefit loss becomes smaller. Individuals who are not cash-cliff constrained would hardly be attracted by seed capital. However, the share of cash-cliff constrained individuals attracted by seed capital is remarkably stable even in the long run at around 50%. Based on these simulations, we would thus expect overall interest in seed capital to be relatively small if people fear that they cannot return to their old DI contract after two years. However, the intention to take-up seed capital should be considerably higher among individuals with disability degrees close to threshold values, who are expected to be cash-cliff constrained. Note: The simulation is bases on information from 2'273 individuals in the treatment and comparison group who participated in the survey and have non-missing information on wages and benefit payments. Individuals who have never worked before DI entry were excluded because wage predictions are based on work history prior DI entry. Details on the simulation can be found in Appendix B.
Short-term interest in seed capital 4.2 Table 2 presents the results from the short-term evaluation. It compares individuals who received the low seed capital offer (reference group) with individuals who received an offer to claim seed capital of CHF 18,000 per reduced quarter DI pension. Only 7% of DI beneficiaries who received the offer to claim seed capital of 9,000 CHF contacted the local DI office. Many of those expressed no interest in seed capital. The share of those who expressed interest in claiming seed capital or even made an appointment with their case workers is much lower at 3% to 4%. DI beneficiaries who received the high seed capital offer did not contact their local DI office more often. The effects are very small, in all cases insignificant, and have relatively small standard errors. Overall, people have thus no or only little interest in takingup seed capital. This finding is consistent with our simulation. Seed capital cannot compensate for reducing DI benefits if recipients fear that they have to return to the labor market for more than two years. Doubling the size of the incentives makes little difference.
We find very little empirical evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects (see Table 3 in Appendix C). Health or perceived labor market frictions (self-reported before the implementation of seed capital and thus not confounded by justification bias, for a discussion see Kapteyn, Smith and van Soest 2009) are not the main drivers for low interest in seed capital. We find no significant differences in reactions to seed capital for individuals reporting fair/bad health compared to individuals reporting good or very good health; and only a slight but non-significantly higher interest in taking-up seed capital for those who find it relatively 15 easy to find employment. Only individuals with higher education tend to be more likely to react to seed capital, which could be a sign for bounded rationality. However, even in the light of overall low interest in seed capital which may be a sign for individuals anticipating longer return-to-work periods, we still expect significantly higher interest among individuals with disability degrees close to threshold values determining higher DI payment. These individuals should be most likely to be cash-cliff constrained and would thus benefit the most from taking-up seed capital. 7 Several studies in behavioral economics show that agents who are faced with complex decisions tend to avoid making an active choice in order not to incur large up-front problem-solving costs (see for example in Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1998, Frank and Lamiraud 2009) . Beshears et al. (2008) argue that choices with consequences far in the future are especially complex. Taking up seed capital certainly falls into that category:
Determining the consequences of return to work on lifetime income requires projecting health, wage and job uncertainty, benefits from different social insurance programs, and capital market returns. It is thus very likely that many DI recipients do not fully understand the lifetime implications of the return to work decision und therefore avoid making active steps. Empirical evidence is provided in Figure 2 . The upper panel provides empirical evidence for bunching behavior prior to the implementation of seed capital. We observe an unusual high share with disability degrees close to a threshold value that determines the next higher benefit level (particularly 50% and 70%), together with a very low share of individuals with
Figure 2: Bunching behavior and responses to seed capital at the cash-cliff
Note: Figure 2 is based on information from respondents who participated in a survey prior the pilot project was implemented, were employed and provided an answer on earnings, and were randomized into one of the treatment groups (N=760). The upper panel presents the histogram with a bin of one percentage points. The lower panel presents interest in seed capital (contacts with local disability offices and expressed interest). Dots are average per disability degree; lines represent the results of kernel-weighted local regression using a triangle kernel and a bandwidth of 3. The lower panel presents empirical evidence for behavioral responses to the announcement of seed capital. Interest in seed capital is typically higher just above the cashcliff compared to just below the threshold. For example, interest in seed capital significantly increases by 0.036 (SD 0.016) at the 50% threshold. The jumps at the other thresholds are smaller and statistically insignificant. 8 In the light of our simulation, these effects are thus far lower than expected.
One possible explanation for the relatively low interest in seed capital even for beneficiaries at cash-cliffs is risk-aversion. Individuals need to trade off a relatively safe payment against higher, but more volatile earnings. Risk aversion could thus significantly prevent the expansion of employment and the take-up of seed capital, particularly for longer return-to-work periods without the possibility to return to the old DI contract.
Moreover, bunching evidence is often interpreted as a behavioral response to non-linear budget sets, but the evidence can be easily misinterpreted. 9 This is particularly relevant in our example since we observe the disability degree and labor supply, but not the individual income thresholds. We can thus not say that people with disability degrees at thresholds really bunch at their individual income thresholds. Bunching at disability degrees that are not associated with higher DI benefits is quite common (for example 80% and 100%). Clustering 8 Interest in low and high seed capital is combined due to sample size restrictions. Estimates are based on the regression discontinuity design routine developed by Nichols (2011) . The estimates for the other two notch points are 0.029 (SD 0.032) for the 60% threshold and 0.032 (SD.0243) for the 70% threshold.
9 Saez (2010) , for example, shows that bunching at kink points imposed by the Earned Income Tax Credit implies implausibly high tax elasticities for recipients with self-employed incomes. He concludes that bunching is more likely due to reporting effects.
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of disability degrees at decimal numbers could thus be also the result of a rule-of-thumb behavior of caseworkers when they assess the disability degree, rather than true labor supply effects. Consequently, the true proportion of individuals who are cash-cliff constrained could be much smaller than it was previously expected.
In the most extreme case, where none of the individuals with disability degrees close to threshold values are truly cash-cliff constrained, we would expect a far lower share of these individuals being interested in seed capital. The simulation predicts that individuals who work and have disability degrees at notch-points but are not cash-cliff constrained should be only slightly more interested in seed capital than other individuals. The necessary return-to work condition for the low/high seed capital is 12%/64% for a return-to-work period of two years, 4%/9% for a return-to-work period of five years, and 2%/2% for return-to-work until retirement. Cash-cliffs may therefore not be a major concern, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set, and strong clustering of individuals at threshold values.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the short-term results of an experiment in the Swiss disability insurance system that provides financial incentives for reintegration into the regular labor market. The program is specifically designed to overcome the financial disincentive of taking up employment (i.e. the loss of disability insurance benefits if earnings exceed certain threshold values). A substantial lump-sum payment is offered to DI recipients who reduce DI payments by at least one quarter by expanding or taking-up employment.
We demonstrate that the substantial amount of money offered, though large by comparison with other cash programs, is still unlikely to fully compensate for the potential 19 income loss of reducing DI benefits. Our simulations show that for a majority of individuals, returning to the labor market for a period of more than two years would not have been beneficial in financial terms even after accounting for the seed capital offset. Mostly, recipients who desire to work more but are encouraged not to expand work because working more does not pay off ("cash-cliff" constrained) will be attracted to take up seed capital.
Consistent with the results from our micro-simulation model, we find that the overall interest in participating in the program is very low. In the first six months of the program only 3% of the 4,000 DI recipients in the treatment group contacted the local DI office and expressed interest in participating in the program. Doubling the amount of the lump-sum payment made no difference. There is also little, if no evidence, of differences in the reaction to the offered seed capital by individuals with different subjective health or employment opportunities. However, risk aversion and bounded rationality may have reinforced the low interest in seed capital.
We find slightly higher reactions to seed capital for individuals with disability degrees at cash-cliffs. These effects are relatively small, despite the fact that bunching behavior at cashcliffs can be observed prior the implementation of the pilot project. Since we also observe bunching at prominent numbers that are not associated with benefits cuts, we conclude that strong clustering of disability degrees is more likely the result of rule-of-thumb behavior when assessing the disability degree rather than true labor supply effects. Consequently, the share of individuals that are truly cash-cliff constrained may be much smaller than initially expected.
As a response to long-term financing problem of DI programs, many countries are considering (or have already implemented) policies to increase DI outflow by providing financial incentives for DI recipients to return to work. In a standard labor supply model, 20 these financial incentives can only be (cost-) effective if a sufficient share of beneficiaries is cash-cliff constrained and encouraged to expand employment. Our results suggest that -at least in Switzerland -cash-cliffs are not a major concern, despite the fact that the partial disability insurance system generates a non-linear budget set.
First pillar benefits
First pillar benefits under the status quo can be observed directly in the administrative records and adjust over time based with the earnings growth rate g.
11 During the return-towork period first pillar benefits are reduced by one quarter of a full DI pension = / * , where denotes the fraction of a full disability pension that a beneficiary receives in year t ( = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) and 0.25.
In the case in which recipients return-to-work for two years disability benefits after return-towork are equal to . If the return-to-work period lasts five years or more, disability benefits after return-to-work are re-calculated taking into account the earnings and contributions during the return-to-work period. More specifically, is calculated using the piecewise linear formula A2 * * 0.74 * * 3 * 1.04 * * 3 * 6 * 2 * 6 * , where is the minimum pension, is the assessment basis, and is an adjustment factor, which is increasing in the number of contribution years . The assessment basis is determined by the average earnings in all years (uncapped) after applying revaluation factors to adjust for wage inflation. Prior to the statutory retirement age is equal to . After the statutory retirement age DI recipients qualify for a full pension, so that is equal to 1.
Second pillar benefits
Around 39% of DI beneficiaries in our sample receive DI benefits from the occupational pension scheme (second pillar). Second pillar DI benefits under the status quo can be observed in the data and are assumed to adjust over time with the earnings growth rate g. During the return-to-work period the second pillar DI pension is reduced by one quarter of a full second pillar DI pension / * where 0.25.
As for the first pillar, second pillar benefits in the after return-to-work period are equal to if recipients return-to-work for less than five years. If the return-to-work period exceeds five years, is re-calculated using the following formula: A3 * * , where is the conversion rate (equal to 7%) at which accumulated capital during the return-to-work period is translated into a lifelong pension. The accumulated capital consists of all contributions made during the return-to-work period plus hypothetical contributions that the individual would have made until the statutory retirement age if his health status had not deteriorated. Because recipients only receive the fraction of a full disability pension that they have forgone during the return-to-work period in addition to , the full second pillar disability pension based on the contributions during the return-to-work period * is adjusted by the factor . After the statutory retirement age recipients receive a full disability pension, which is equal to * .
Means-tested benefits
In our sample, around 32% of DI beneficiaries claim means-tested benefits which are awarded in case DI benefits from the first and second pillar are not sufficent to meet minimial costs of living. Means-tested benefits under the status quo can be observed directly in the data and adjust over time with the earnings growth rate g. The calculation of means-tested benefits during and after the return-to-work period requires knowledge of a recipient's income, assets as well as total expenditures (cost-of-living allowance, rent or interest on mortgage, and heath care). We observe a recipient's income and cost-of-living allowance, but we have no information on assets, rent or mortgage payments, and health care expenditures that are not covered by the mandatory health insurance. To surmount this problem, we use the following approach: First, we calculate the hypothetical annual means-tested benefits ignoring potential asset holdings and health care expenditures that are not covered by the health insurance:
where is a cost-of-living allowance, denotes the health insurance premium, denotes expenditure for housing, and denotes spousal earnings. The calculation of means-tested benefit also includes hypothetical earnings or two thirds of a DI recipient's earnings less an exemption whichever is higher. The level of hypothetical earnings depends on a DI recipient's remaining work capacity. Second, we calculate an adjustment factor by subtracting the actual annual means-tested benefits in the status quo from the hypothetical annual means-tested benefits : 5
The adjustment factor thus measures the bias in the amount of hypothetical means-tested benefits that is due to asset holdings and health care expenditures. Third, if we assume that asset holdings and health expenditures are unaffected by the return-to-work decision, then we can calculate means-tested benefits during and after return-to-work according to the following formula:
6 ,
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Step 2: Predicting workload The coefficients from the above regression are used to to predict potential earnings withoug disability. All explanatory variables are observed in the data. However, workload is unobserved (or zero) for those who are not working. Workload must therefore be predicted for those who are not working. We use the following regression to predict workload 6 ln βX , where X is a vector of explanatory variables that is identical to the vector of variables used in equation (B5), except for log(workload), which is now the dependent variable. Results are not reported but available from the authors upon request.
Step 3: Imputing potential earnings without disability In order to impute potential wages without disability, we compute fitted values from regression (B5) for all individuals in the sample. For individuals who are currently working, all regressors are taken from administrative and survey data, including workload. For those individuals who are not working, we plug in the fitted values obtained in Step 2 for workload to replace missing values (or zeroes) for workload. In order to capture the uncertainty associated with the computation of fitted values for potential earnings without disability, we compute a distribution of potential wages without disability for each individual. More specifically, for each individual we randomly draw 1,000 error terms derived from regression (B6) and add them to their fitted values in order to obtain 1,000 values for potential earnings withoug disability. These 1,000 observations for each individual are then used to compute current earnings sc for different levels of the Disability degree under seed capital take-up (Disability degree sc ), according to equation B3. Current earnings sc are then used as earnings during the return-towork period (w ) in order to simulate gains and losses from seed capital take-up. 
